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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA M. BURKE,
Case No. 20404
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
RICHARD C.

BURKE,

Defendant/Appellant,
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court erred in a divorce proceeding in

determining that property that had been acquired during the
marriage in the name of a corporation was actually marital
property and therefore, an asset of the marriage to be divided
between the parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this proceeding, appellant was the defendant in a divorce
action filed by his wife as civil number D-15225, in the Third
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The

parties were initially divorced in 1979 but all other issues
concerning child custody, support and property were reserved to a
later time for a trial.

The matter came on for trial on October

24, 1980, before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, sitting without
a jury.

Memorandums were requested by the court and on November

10th, 1980, the court entered a minute entry decision.

Findings

of fact and conclusions of law and the decree of divorce were not
entered in the matter until September 7, 1984, and an appeal from
that decision was taken to this court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant requests that this court reverse the decision
of the trial court with respect to certain parcels of real estate
which were awarded jointly to the parties and rule that all such
property was corporate property belonging to Advance Business
Equipment, Inc.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties in this action were married in 1960 and lived
together as husband and wife until approximately March, 1977,
when the wife filed for divorce in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in civil number
D-15225.
On April 6, 1967, the appellant, along with others, formed a
corporation known as Advance Business Equipment, Inc.
Exhibit "11")

(See R.

The corporation existed continually until the time

of 'the parties divorce and, in fact, is an operating entity at
the present time.

The corporation has had various officers and a

board of directors that met at various times and held
stockholders meetings at least once a year.

The corporation's

charter was never revoked or suspended by the State of Utah and
the corporation was, at the divorce hearing in October of 1980,
and is currentlyr in good standing with the State of Utah.

The

appellant is and has been the president of the corporation during
its duration and at various times has held between 25% and 50% of
the stock, either personally or with the ability to vote the
stock held by his children.

During the life of the corporation,

it has had approximately eight additional stockholders, with the
amount of stock held varying at any given time.

There have

salways been at least three stockholders in addition to the
defendant and his children.

(See R. Exhibit M l " , the corporate

record book showing stock issued, the corporate minutes and other
activities of the corporation.)
The corporation operated as a closed operation with the
stock being held by the appellant, his children and other
stockholders.

The nature of the business was to supply and

distribute various types of business equipment as a wholesaler.
(See R. articles of incorporation Exhibit "1")

All transactions

conducted by Advance Business during it's life have been
conducted as a corporation, including the use of sales receipts,
letters, other documents, etc.

They all bear the corporate named

and are signed by Richard Burke as president of the corporation.
(See R. p.144, defendant's memorandum and Exhibits which were
introduced at the time of the trial.)
On three occasions prior to the parties divorce, the
corporation purchased three separate pieces of real estate.

The

first transaction took place on June 15, 1970, when the
corporation purchased, for investment purposes, a dwelling
situated on approximately one-third of an acre with an adjacent
two and one-half acre pasture and an adjacent building lot.

A

mortgage was obtained at Ogden First Federal in the name of
Advance Business Equipment, Inc., and all payments on the
mortgage were made by Advance Business Equipment.

Approximately

three months after the acquisition of the property, the parties
moved into the home and used the same as their residence, until
1977 when the defendant was forced to leave.

The respondent
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continued to reside in the home and the company made the monthly
mortgage payments.

(See R. corporate minute book, Exhibit "11" f

minutes of the meeting of June 15, 1970.)
The second transaction took place later in 1970, when the
corporation acquired approximately 15 acres of raw, undeveloped
land now known as Pepperwood.

This acquisition was in the form

of a contract for the purchase of land between Advance Business
Equipment, Inc. and H.R. Fisher who owned the property in fee
simple.

The contract called for one yearly payment.

The company

paid the annual payment until 1976 when, because the company was
unable to make the payment, the property was transferred to
Sandra Maxwell, the sister of the defendant.

Maxwell assumed the

existing contract between Advance Business and H.R. Fisher.

(See

R. appellant1s and defendant's memorandum p.144 and 153.)
The third transaction took place on June 14, 1978, when a
building lot was acquired by the company in a subdivision known
as Dimple Dell.

The company purchased the lot in the company

name pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors.

(See R.

Exhibit "11", minutes of the meeting of June 14, 1978.)
Following the trial of this matter on October 24, 1980, the
trial judge required memorandums from the parties, (See R. p.144
and 153) and specifically requested that the parties address the
issue of whether or not Richard Burke was the alter ego of
Advance business, or in effect, whether the corporate veil of
Advance Business could be pierced with respect to the three
property transactions set forth above.

The court, after

reviewing the memorandums, ruled, as set forth in the findings of

*-

fact and conclusions of lav; and the decree of divorce, (Exhibit
"1" and "2" to this brief) that the property consisting of the
home and the adjoining pasture land was marital property and the
home was awarded to the respondent and the pasture land to the
defendant.

The building lot the Dimple Dell subdivision was

marital property and was awarded jointly to the parties, but the
15 acres in Pepperwood was not marital property and therefore,
would not dispose of it in the divorce.
Because the appellant believes that this ruling is
inconsistent in light of the facts presented, this appeal v/as
taken in an effort to clarify that actual status of the property
in question.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in determining that the Pepperwood
property was not marital property but in finding that the
parties1 residence, the adjoining pasture land and the Dimple
Dell lot were marital property.

That the proper ruling should

have been that all property in question belonged to the
corporation, that the appellant herein was not the alter ego and
that none of the property, therefore, was marital property
subject to disposition in the divorce proceeding.
ARGUMENT
The question before this Court in the instant case does not
sound in domestic relations but sounds in corporations.

The

relief the appellant seeks is based upon the clear pronouncements
of this Court in a number of cases which establish the guidelines
for examining the actual existence and viability of a corporation
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and whether or not that entity is truly a corporation or is
merely the alter ego or a shell for the operation of a single
individual.

There is no factual dispute in this case as to the

establishment and existence of the corporation known as Advance
Business Equipment, Inc.

There is no factual dispute that that

corporation purchased the property in question and made the
payments on it.

There is no factual dispute that at the time of

the initiation of the divorce and at the time of the actual
divorce trial, all three of the properties were held in the name
of Advance Business Equipment, Inc., and had never been in the
name of either of the parties to the divorce.

The only question

then is was the corporation really the alter ego of Richard Burke
or was it, pursuant to this Court's guideline, an bone fide
corporation and therefore, the property in question would not
have been part of the marital estate subject to disposition in
the divorce proceedings by Judge Baldwin.
Utah law is clear as to the requirements for disregarding
the corporate entity upon a claim that the corporation is merely
an extention of an individual.

It should be carefully noted that

this Court is a court of equity, and should pierce the corporate
veil only after great caution is exercised and not precipitantly
and that each case involving the existence or non-existence of
the corporate entity must rest upon it's special facts and
circumstances.

(See Corporation §14 18 Am Jur 2d.)

The burden

of proof is upon the party moving to have the corporation shield
set aside, or in this case, the respondent in the trial court.
In Utah, three decisions of this Court have enunciated the

*1-

requirements that a trier of fact must consider in determining
whether the moving party has met the burden, thus setting aside
the corporate entity.
In the case of Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526 (Utah
1973), Justice Ellett, writing for a unanimous court, stated as
fo]lows:
Ordinarily a corporation is regarded
as a legal entity, separate and apart from
the stockholders, but the corporation veil
which protects stockholders from liability
for debts of the corporation will be
pierced and true relationship between
stockholders and corporation looked at
where legal entity is used to perpetrate a
fraud, to justify a wrong, or to defeat
justice.
The term "alter ego" is used to
describe a situation where courts go behind
corporate entity and hold a stockholder liable
for debts of the corporation or to hold that
it is the stockholder and not the corporation
which owns the assets.
The "alter ego" doctrine is generally
applied to situation known as "one-man corporation,"
i.e., where one man owns practically all of the
stock , either directly or through others who hold
it for his use and benefit, and where stockholder
uses the corporation as a shield to protect him
from debts or wrongdoings; it cannot be applied to
make stockholder liable for legitimate debts of the
corporation unless he is so closely allied with the
corporation through ownership and management as
to enable courts to see clearly that corporate entity
is but a sham and it is the stockholder who is doing
business behind the corporate shield. (Id at 371,
emphasis added.)
This concept was further amplified by Justice Maughan, again
writing for a unanimous court, in Norman v. Murray First Thrift &
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979), wherein the following
comment was made:
In order to disregard corporate
entity...there must be a concurrence of

-8-

two circumstances: (1) there must be such
unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual no longer exist,
(i.e. vis the corporation is, in fact,
the alter ego of one or a few individuals),
and (2) observance of the corporation form
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice,
or an inequitable result would follow.
(Id at 1030)
Most recently, in the case of Messick v. PHD Trucking
Service, 678 p.2d 791 (Utah 1984), Justice Hall further refined
the doctrine set out by Justice Maughan in Norman when he said:
The first prong of the test is often
termed the "formalities requirement,"
referring to the corporate formalities
required by statute. It is established
upon a showing of the corporation's failure
to observe said statutory formalities. The
test's second prong is addressed to the
conscience of the court, and the circumstances
under which it will be met will vary with each
case.
He further goes on to say that:
In examining evidence by which a trial
court should be upheld in disregarding a
corporate entity, the court would look at
the following: evidence of the corporation's
neglect of statutory formalities, and evidence
that the observance of a corporate entity
would sanction a fraud or promote injustice or
inequitable results. (jCd at 794)
There is no question in this case that all of the corporate
formalities were observed by Advance Business Equipment in
conducting itfs business, including the purchase of the property
in question.

The only real issue is the conscience of the court

and whether or not the observance would sanction a fraud, promote
injustice or an inequitable result.

In effect, that is what

Judge Baldwin was called upon to determine after hearing the
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testimony and reviewing the exhibits in this case at the trial in
October of 1980,

His ruling, however, is inconsistent and

therefore, we are unable to determine precisely what he found
concerning this second prong of the test.

On the one hand, he

determined that the Pepperwood property which was, in effect,
purchased by the corporation and then sold to a third party was
corporate property and not subject to his decision.

On the

other, he find the Dimple DeJl and the pasture land and home to
be marital property and divided that between the two parties.

It

was the same corporation involved, the same type of activities,
the same status and yet the ruling is inconsistent.
It is appellant's position that the only consistent ruling,
given the facts presented, would be that all of the property was
corporate property and that it was not marital property subject
to distribution by the court in a divorce proceeding.

There was

no indication of fraud, and no indication of injustice.
Appellant concedes that perhaps the result may appear to be
inequitable if one looks at the property purely in a sense of
what each of the parties received from the divorce proceedings.
It only becomes inequitable, however, if we determine that the
appellant received all of the property personally and the
defendant had nothing.

This, of course, was not the case.

The

proper result would have been that the corporation, of which the
appellant is a stockholder, but only one of many, would have
received the use and benefit of the property.

In addition, the

respondent received the use and benefit of the home and the
property during the course of the marriage, and received the bulk
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of the personal property that the parties acquired during their
marriage.

Therefore, if one assumes the existence and the

viability of the corporation and that it is the corporation that
would receive the property, if this decision were reversed,
rather than the appellant, then there is no inequity or injustice
present.
Appellant believes that the trial court cannot have it both
ways.

It cannot find one piece of property as a non-marital

asset and the others as marital assets when all of the facts
concerning the acquisition of the property in the name of
corporation and distribution of the property were the same.

This

inconsistency clearly demonstrates an abuse of discretion by the
court and a decision which is clearly erroneous in light of the
evidence and therefore, is the proper subject for a reversal by
this Court.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this court, in
furtherance of it f s corporate doctrine set forth in the cases
cited herein, review the findings of the trial court and
determine that the property in question belonged to Advance
Business Equipment and not to the parties and therefore, was not
the subject of distribution in a marital estate in a divorce
proceeding, and reverse the lower court's decision and restore
the property in question to Advance Bvtsir/ess Equipment, Inc.

V
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

" ''-

JOHI
AttfcrAiley f o r

Appellant
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i R TFF D ! ! '.'?)•' : FT COURT
COUNrrV OK SALT FAKK, STATU OR UTAH

PATRICIA M. FURKF,

:

%

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

K1NDJNGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OK RAW
NUNC PRO TUNC

:
• Civil No. 0 - 1 ^ 2 5

RICHARD C. BURKE,
Defendant.

:

The above entitled matter came on regularly

for hearing on

the 24th day of October, 1980, before tfte Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Jr., one of the judges of the above entitled court,
sitting without a jury, plaintiff being personally present

and

represented by counsel, Gerald Gundry. and defendant being
personally present ?.nd represented by counsel, John T. C a m e , and
testimony having been taken over a period of two days, and the
court also requesting the filing of written memorandum, arte: after
reviewing all or the evidence arid the memorandums of the parties,
and the court h e m e

fully udvis.od in the premises, now find .^ as

foilows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the parties were previously divorced by this court.

on September \ (\ ,

1.977 and

the court, therefore, for the purpose

of this iieariiiO, was to dispose or 'ho mar j t ..« j prop* i i \; .
2.

That pU:inti f; if. a tit arc proper person to nave riv

care, custodv and conrrol '..•; the owe minor children o: ; ho
parties, with reasonably' rights r. f visitation
3.

That plaintiff

in the die fondao t .

is in need -of child support and

defendant's income would allow for the payment of $ 1 fa) per month
per child, for a total of S3 00 per month.
4.

That the defendant is in arrears in child support from a

previous order of the court in the sum of $6,900.
5.

That plaintiff is able bodied and presently employed,

and is in no need of alimony.
6.

That the parties' home and the adjoining acreage,

located at 4596 South 785 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, is marital
property and the home should be awarded to the plaintiff and the
adjoining acreage should be awarded to the defendant.

That each

party should assume and discharge any debt against the property
awarded to him or her, and hold the other harmless therefrom.
"7.

That the parties' building

lot in Dimple Del Subdivision

#2 and their cabin site in Island Park, Idaho, are marital
property and should be awarded equally to the parties.
8.

That the 15 acres o:

unimproved property, known as

Pepper Wood, is not marital property and,
should be taken by the court concerning
9.

That the plaintiir

its disposition.

should bo awarded aJi of the

furniture, fixtures and wares located
exception of the following

therefore, no action

in her possession with the

items currently

which should be awarded to thr: de !V-ndapt :

in tier possession,
the Navaho Indian rug,

the Remington pi ;: • • , <\ s't

• •! silver in Mil::, ,) J;<J ;J:I in*? of - :•-•-• a

sca;.c, a painting <d an "indi.u:, - book of the Old West , u o; o:
which should be awarded

;• o the oe ; • mclan t .

T p. add i * ion, eo toucan, t

.15; awarded h.is grandmother's br."i:-s bell , an i ndiar: Cv r<-;o ;n i a !
rue, one of the throe other

.Indian rugs, three pen sro-tches,

three hafen family history books auo one-half of all the
ographs.
.10.

That defendant should be awarded all of his interest i.u

the company kno\-Jn as Advanced business Equipment.
11.

That each party .should assume and discharge their own

attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court concludes as
follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the plaintiff

should be awarded custody of the

parties two minor children, subject to reasonable visitation in
:! the defendant.
2.

That the defendant should be ordered to pay the sum of

$150 per month per child as and for child support, for a total o:'
$30 0 per month.
3.

That 'judgment should be entered against the defendant

for $6,900 for chile support arrearages to date.
4.
or

That the n 1 a i n t i. \ I should not bo awarded any aiimonv row

in the future.
5.

That plaintii't should be awarded the home at 4596 South

785 East, Salt bake City, Utah.

The defendant should be awarded

the adied r*i n g acreage to the home.

That each party should assume

and discharge :\:\y Mebt niifiiimt. the pru['ori;y ar'.d hob: ' he <M..h«-r
harmless there f rem.
6.

That the building

lot. in Dimple Del Subdivision. -12 an»:

the cabin site in Island Park, Idaho, should be riVJ^raoc: equally
to the parties.
7.

That the 15 acres of

Wood is not marital

property, and, therefore, no action should be

taken by the court concerning
8.

unimproved property known as Pepper

its disposition.

That the plaintiff should be awarded all of the

furniture, fixtures and wares located in her possession with the
exception of the following items currently in her possession,
which should be awarded to the defendant:

the Navaho Indian rug,

the Remington prints, a set of silver prints, a painting of a sea
scape, a painting of an Indian, a book of the Old West, all of
which should be awarded to the defendant.

In addition, defendant

should be awarded his grandmother's brass bell, an Indian
ceremonial rug, one of the three other Indian rugs, three pen
sketches, three Hafen faraily history books and one-half of all
the photographs.
9.

That defendant should be awarded all of his interest in

the company known as Advanced Business Equipment.
10.

That each party should assume and discharge their own

attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action and hold the
other harmless therefrom.
DATED this

day of August, 1984.
BY THE COURT:
FiRNEST F . BALDWIN, J R .
DISTRICT r n i u r r .innr.P

John T. Caine of
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS
Attorney for Defendant
2 568 Via s h i n g ton Bou lev a r d
Ogden, Utah 84 4 01
Telephone:
393-5367

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA M. BURKE,
Plaintiff,

:
:

DECREE OF DIVORCE
NUNC PRO TUNC

vs .
RICHARD C. BURKE,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
the 24th day of October, 1980, before the Honorable .Ernest R.
Baldwin, judge of the above entitled court, sitting without a
jury, and plaintiff being personally present and represented by
counsel, Gerald Gundry, and defendant being personally present
and represented by counsel, John T. Caine, and testimony having
been taken over a period of two days, and the court also
requesting the filing of written memorandum, and after reviewing
all of the evidence and the memorandums of the parties, and the
court being fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore
signed and entered herein its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, NOW, THEREFORE,
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:

1.

That the parties were previously divorced by this court

on September 16, 1977, and the court, therefore, for the purpose
of this hearing, was to dispose of the marital property.
2.

That the plaintiff shall be awarded the custody of the

parties1 two minor children, subject to reasonable visitation in
the de fendant.
3.

That "judgment shall be entered against the defendant foi

$6,900 for child support arrearages to date,*/.
4.

{^^t o b^^J

I^ &&

That the plaintiff shall not be awarded any alimony now

or in the future.
5.

That plaintiff shall be awarded the home at 4596 South

785 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The defendant shall be awarded

the adjoining acreage to the home.

That each party shall assume

and discharge any debt against the property and hold the other
harmless therefrom.
6.

*

That the building lot in Dimple Del Subdivision #2 and

the cabin site in Island Park, Idaho', Hshaxl be awarded equally/to

the parties. &-*& t ^ Z ^ ^ A ^
7.

&^<u^

^^v^c^w^

That the 15 acres of unimproved property knownL^s Pepper

Wood is not marital property, and, therefore, no action shall be
taken by the court concerning its disposition.
8.

That the plaintiff shall be awarded all of the

furniture, fixtures and wares located in her possession with the
exception of the following items currently in her possession,
which shall be awarded to the defendant:

the Navaho Indian rug,

the Remington prints, a set of silver prints, a painting of a sea
scape, a plaintiff of an Indian, a book of the Old West, all of

<^r

which shall be awarded to the defendant.

In addition, defendant

shall be awarded his grandmother's brass bell, an Indian
ceremonial rug, one of the three other Indian rugs, three pen
sketches, three Hafen family history books and one-half of all of
the photographs.
9.

That defendarit shall be awarded all of his interest in

the company known as Advanced Business Equipment.
10.

That each party shall assume and discharge their own

attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action and hold the
other harmless therefrom.
DATED this

/<?7o.

s

/

/

t*^s<zj?'-

^7 day of^^tnrtr, 1984. ~ £/=:/~<?<r/7>i/-* &cS0U**<^
BY THE GO\Xfptf:

.^tfjd^
RN-EST F. BALDWIN X^JR
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

